Abstract: Theoretical literature seeking to explain public-debt accumulation exploded in recent years as debt crises emerged in many nations. However, empirical evaluation of political-economy theories has lagged that of basic economic-conditions models. This paper joins those beginning to redress the imbalance, operationalizing and evaluating standard electoral and partisan budget-cycles arguments and their modern, rational-expectations-strategic variants. The evidence strongly suggests modification of the former and flatly rejects the latter. Electoral budget-cycles exist, but their timing is different than usually assumed. Partisan debt-effects also exist, but they run in commonly expected directions (left-deficits, right-surpluses) only when incumbents' perceived risk of replacement by ideological competitors is high. They run in opposite directions when such replacement risk is low. The pattern contradicts recent rational-strategic models but perhaps suggests an alternative, equally rational-strategic, logic for partisan manipulation of the budget.
Figure 1: Gross Debt of Consolidated Central Government in 21 OECD Countries, 1948-1997
However, excepting empirical work exploring the tax-smoothing model of Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) , few have tested the many theories purporting to explain Figure 1 . Recent empirical attention (Roubini and Sachs 1989ab; Edin and Ohlsson 1991; Sturm 1994, 1997; Borrelli and Royed 1995; DeHaan et al. 1998 ) focuses on theories of weak government and delayed stabilization. Others (Von Hagen 1992; Harden 1994,1996; Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1996; ) stress budgetary rules and institutions or bicameralism and partisan differences between the chambers (Heller 1998) . This paper joins those in starting to redress the imbalance between theoretical development and empirical testing, evaluating traditional and rational-expectations-strategic electoral and partisan budget-cycle arguments regarding political manipulation of debt, using the postwar experiences of 21 OECD countries as the data base. 3 The analysis unfolds thus. Section II introduces the electoral-and partisan-budget-cycle arguments to be evaluated, identifies the necessary control variables, and operationalizes them. Section III conducts the econometric analysis, and Section IV concludes, evaluating electoral and partisan budget-cycle theories in light of this new evidence.
II. Reviewing and Operationalizing the Theoretical Literature
Descriptive statistics for all data and simple correlations of independent variables with debts and deficits appear in the Appendix II.
II.A. Standard Electoral and Partisan Budget-Cycles
At least since Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) , political economists have suspected that politicians systematically attempt to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes. At simplest, the hypothesis is that governments employ expansionary policies (here: higher deficits) prior to elections in order to boost the economy in time to earn an electoral boon from myopic voters. At least since Hibbs (1977) , political economists have argued that parties of the right and left differ in their fiscalpolicy priorities. Specifically, left governments favor larger public economies, greater redistribution, and more Keynesian expansion and so are expected to run greater deficits than right governments.
To examine electoral budget-cycles, a variable summing to one over the year preceding an election is created (ELE), using Mackie and Rose (1991) 
plus European Journal of Political
Research, Political Data Annuals for recent years. More precisely: in election year t, ELE t =M/12+(d/D)/12 with M complete months before the election, d the day of the incomplete month, and D total days in the incomplete month. 1-ELE t is allocated to the year before the election (if pre-election years overlap, ELE can exceed 1). 4 To examine partisan budget-cycles, first, every party that has been in government since 1945 in all 21 countries is coded, 0=far-left to 10=far-right, using indices from Laver and Hunt (1992) and those compiled in Laver and Schofield (1991) . With these codes and party composition of cabinet ministers in each government (Lane et al. 1991; Woldendorp et al. 1994 Woldendorp et al. , 1998 , an average left-right position of each government is obtained: the political center of gravity (CoG). 5 For comparison: US Democrats and Republicans 2.8± CoG-units apart (4.8-7.6) while UK Labour and Conservatives are 4.9± CoG-units apart (2.8-7.7). Alesina and Tabellini (1990) note that incumbent governments can affect the fiscal situation subsequent governments will inherit by accumulating debt and thus constraining their fiscal options.
II.B. Strategic Budget-Cycles: Replacement Risk and Debt to Commit Future Governments
In their model, the more the alternative governments' desired spending-compositions differ, the more incumbents will accumulate debt to constrain their expected opposition. The greater the ideological distance (in terms of desired-spending composition) of potential replacements from the incumbent and the more likely such a replacement, the more debt incumbents accumulate. 6 Persson and Svensson (1989) offer a similar model in which governments differ in desired spending-level.
In this model, the low-spender (presumably the right) accumulates debt when faced with the prospect of replacement to constrain big-spending (presumably left) replacements. The left behaves oppositely. These models, then, emphasize the strategic use of debt to increase or decrease fiscal constraints on the opposition. Aghion and Bolton (1990 ), Milesi-Ferretti (1993 ), and Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1993 stress, instead, that incumbents can affect their re-election probability through debt policies that alter the partisan preferences of the population. Specifically, if left parties are known or suspected greater inflationary or outright default-risks than right parties, then right governments can run deficits to increase the amount of voter-held debt and so decrease electoral support for the suspected default-prone left. 7 The left, conversely, can reduce debt to alleviate default-risk concerns about it among the electorate. However, these models do not fully specify testable conditions under which such incentive would dominate the more familiar (opposite) incentives emphasized in standard partisan theory.
These arguments identify ideological polarization across governments or, more precisely, the expected ideological distance of future governments from incumbents as an explanator of public , is positive (negative) for sufficiently right (left) CoG. The other arguments do not specify conditions under which right and left act counter-intuitively.
However, presumably they either do so when weakening electoral support for the opposition seems especially valuable or when the risk of losing critical support among their own partisans seems especially affordable. The former is likely when facing an electoral threat (i.e. when RR is high), and the latter when incumbents feel very secure electorally (i.e. when RR is low). Thus, including CoG, RR, and CoG·RR should cover most possibilities and leave it an empirical issue.
II.C. Economic Controls
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Economic theory suggests five controls: unemployment rates (representing spending shocks), real GDP growth rates (revenue shocks), real interest rates minus real growth rates times outstanding debt (servicing costs), terms-of-trade movements (open-economy shocks), 11 and expected real growth rates minus expected real interest rates (reflecting expected future ability to repay debt).
Internationally comparable unemployment rates (UE) are from OECD sources. 12 Real-GDP 
II.D. Other Socio-Political Controls
Roubini and Sachs (1989ab), Alesina and Drazen (1991) , Spolaore (1993) , and Drazen and Grilli (1993) develop war-of-attrition models of public-debt stabilization. Governing parties will likely dispute whose supporters must bear necessary fiscal adjustments' costs even if they agree that current debt-levels or persistent deficits require adjustment. If a single party controls government, it might easily shift costs to outsiders. Multi-party governments will certainly also try to shift costs, but devising policies that neutrally distribute adjustment costs among governing parties will be more difficult. The more fragmented and polarized the coalition, the harder neutral adjustment plans will be to find. Thus, given uncertainty among parties over how long others will tolerate steadily rising debt before capitulating to stabilization plans whose distributional implications they dislike, more polarized and fragmented governments will produce more deadlock, delaying stabilization longer. 15 War-of-attrition theories thus highlight fractionalization and polarization of partisan interests within governments. To measure these, use the party left-right codes described above to code the maximum distance between CoG scores of coalition parties for polarization (ADwiG), and simply count the number of parties in government for fractionalization (NoP). 16, 17 Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) and Tabellini (1991) note that private capital markets do not allow negative bequests but public debt effects just such transfers from future to present. Therefore, the poor, old, and especially old-poor, who most desire negative bequests, will also most favor public debt. Thus, countries with relatively poor and old populations should have higher or fasterrising debts; and, since greater wealth-inequality usually implies more poor relative to wealthy, more inegalitarian democracies should also amass greater debt (controlling for total wealth).
One demographic statistic reflecting the relative weight of positive-and negative-bequest incentives is the ratio of population over 64 to that under 15 (OY), from OECD sources. 18 Aggregate wealth is as easily measured: the natural log of real GDP per capita (LRGDPC) from Penn World Tables v 5. 6. Cross-country/cross-time comparable data on wealth distribution, however, are non-existent, and income-distribution data are notoriously problematic and spotty at best. To achieve some annual indicator of income distribution comparable across 21 countries and 35+ years, then, consider the ratio of GDP per-capita, indexed to 100 in 1986, to a manufacturing-workers'-wage index, also 100 in 1986. This compares the ratio of economy-average income to blue-collar wageincome 19 to the same income-disparity index in the same country in 1986. Then, taking a GINI index from each country as near 1986 as possible (from OECD 1995), standardizing it relative to the US in 1986, and then multiplying by the within-country, across-time comparable index above, produces a cross-time and cross-country comparable index of income disparity. This relative real-wage position of manufacturing workers (RWPMW) compares each country-year to the US 1986 where RWPMW=1. Higher (lower) RWPMW values imply greater (lesser) disparity. Measuring joint ageand-income distributions is still more difficult; but, minimally, multiplying the old-young ratio and the income-disparity index (OY·RWPMW) will distinguish country-years with high old-young ratios and high income-disparity, from those moderate in both or low in one, from those low in both. Weingast et al. (1981) argue that policy makers representing sub-national constituencies tend to weight excessively the benefits of spending in their constituency relative to the aggregate cost of financing it because spending-benefits often accrue largely within constituency while tax-costs are usually spread more equally across the polity. If majorities for fiscal legislation are assembled by logrolling compromises, then budgets will overspend on constituency projects proportionally to the number of constituencies. 20 Though overspending does not necessarily imply deficits, fiscallyilluded voters may imply deficits proportional to spending. 21 Velasco (1995) shows, moreover, that dynamic multiple-constituencies models imply deficits proportional to the number of constituencies, even absent fiscal illusion.
Empirically, comparing the number of constituencies across democracies is difficult, partly because constituency varies in substantive meaning across country-times (Franzese and Nooruddin 1999 number of electoral districts. Singly, each measure is problematic, but jointly they might adequately control for empirical manifestations of the multiple-constituencies problem.
Many scholars argue that voters incompletely understand their government's intertemporal budget constraint and, so, tend simply to reward spending and punish taxing. If voters misapprehend the relation between current deficits and future taxes, opportunistic politicians could simply spend more than they tax for electoral advantage. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) suggest further that such fiscal illusion should be more evident where complicated fiscal structures make cost-benefit analysis of public taxing and spending more difficult for voters. By implication, countries with more complicated fiscs should be associated with higher/faster-rising debt.
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OECD sources provide data on tax structure divided by source of revenue into direct and indirect taxes and other receipts of general government, and by level of government into central, local, and social-security government revenue. Some of these and other subdivisions are available for very few country years, 27 leaving only three useful measures: general-government indirect taxes and total taxes as shares of total current revenue (ITTCR and TTTCR), and central government total current revenue as a share of general government total current revenue (CGRGGR). Indirect taxes are likely more difficult to assess than other taxes, while taxes generally are likely easier to assess than other revenue sources (e.g., seigniorage). Public-revenue generation by one central authority rather than multiple local authorities and separate (e.g., social security) administrations also likely facilitates cost-benefit analysis of public endeavors. Thus, fiscal illusion should be more apparent in country-years characterized by relatively high indirect taxes and low total taxes as shares of revenue and low central government revenue as a share of general. 28 Finally, note that, historically, governments reduced massive debts largely via inflation. An independent, conservative central bank, however, would hinder this relatively easy escape, so central bank independence (CBI) may dissuade prudent governments from debt-accumulation. 29, 30 Capitalizing on the most commonly used (and therefore presumably the best)
of the many CBI indices in the literature, the measure here averages two each from Cukierman (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991) and one from Bade and Parkin (1982) .
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III. Empirical Estimation of Electoral and Partisan Budget-Cycles
The usable empirical sample is 618 country-years: US, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Note first that debt adjusts very slowly. The adjustment rate also depends critically upon realinterest net of real-growth rates (DRIG), fractionalization (NoP), and, less so, polarization (ADwiG) within governments (see Appendix II). At sample means (-1.3, +2.1, and +1.3 respectively), the estimates imply that long-run debt-effects of permanent shocks are 30± times their immediate deficit-impacts and that 20± years pass before half the total long-run effect is realized. All discussion below assumes DRIG, NoP, and ADwiG at sample means, debt initially stable, and all else constant.
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Regarding electoral cycles, illustrated in Figure 2 , note several striking results. First, ceteris paribus, the years before and after elections are both significantly positively associated with deficits (p.0004 jointly), combining to produce +1%± of GDP deficit. Second, because deficits exhibit strong short-term momentum and debt adjusts so slowly, the effect compounds, growing to maximum +1.4%± three years post-election. Even this one-election effect (left y-axis) is sizeable, but, third, since these democracies have elections minimally every 5 years, the debt-impact of one election has barely begun to dissipate when another arrives. Debt response-paths to electoral politics in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-cycle countries are plotted against the right y-axis. As shown, a country averaging elections every 3 years would, ceteris paribus, have long-run debt +2.7%± of GDP higher than one averaging elections every 4 years, which, in turn has long-run debt +1.6%± higher than one averaging elections every 5 years. Finally, electoral-cycle oscillation is most visible in 5-year-cycle countries (amplitude .5%± of GDP) and more muted in higher-frequency cycles (.4%± 4-year and .3%± 3-year). The US, which elects part of its government every two years, illustrates these points.
ELE in the US cycles: .66, .05, .28, .11, beginning with a presidential election-year. These frequent but partial elections in the US produce the least-accentuated electoral cycles (amplitude .19±) but also among the largest long-run electoral effects (between 3-and 4-year-cycle cases). Response of Debt as % of GDP to a Single Election in T0 1994, Keech and Lee 1995, Gallagher et al. 1995.) More mundanely, this may simply reflect calendar-year-measured ELE versus different (and varying) fiscal-year-measured debt (though great care was taken to dynamic modeling and to election timing within calendar years). Regardless, previous work typically sought only pre-electoral effects and, furthermore, most focused on the US case where cycles are most muted. Thus, previous failure to find strong electoral cycles may be greater condemnation of empirical research design than of electoral-cycle theory. Clearly, "reports of electoral political-budget-cycle theory demise have been greatly exaggerated," and their study certainly warrants reopening. Finally, though electoral-cycle theory emphasizes fiscal fluctuations, slow debt-adjustment rates imply that electoral frequency also importantly affects cross-national differences in long-run debt levels. 5-year-cycle democracies accumulate almost 5% of GDP less debt than 3-year-cycle democracies, ceteris paribus, and, given called early elections, some have averaged elections more frequently still.
Partisan debt-effects also exist, and they depend critically on the replacement risk incumbents face (coefficients on CoG and CoG·RR are highly significant: p .0007 and .004 individually, p .002 jointly). As Figure 3 reveals, the deficit-effect of 1-CoG-unit rightward shifts in partisanship at high replacement risk (above RR .79) is in the traditional, lower-deficit direction and can be appreciable, -.7%± of GDP at sample maximum RR (2.56±), but the estimated effect is negative (i.e. RR>.79±) in only 7.5%± of the sample and significantly so (RR>1.1± u p<.1 one-sided) in but 2.75%± of the sample. Right governments, contrarily, are significantly (p<.1 one-sided) associated with moderately higher deficits when replacement risk is below 0.58± (e.g., 25% chance of replacement by opposition 2.32 CoG units to the left) which occurs in 85%± of the sample. Thus, far more usually, partisan effects are relatively small and operate opposite simple partisan-theory expectations. to reduce deficits 0.43%± of GDP. The same replacement-risk increases would bring the UK's Labour party (CoG=2.78) to increase deficits 0.39%± of GDP. However, at sample-mean, CoG=5.54
(roughly a typical Democratic-president-led US government), the effect is negligible (+.02%±). Thus, neither debt-as-constraint argument receives much empirical support. Replacement risk seems more to induce government pursuit of standard partisan objectives than to trigger strategic fiscal-policy manipulation to constrain potential replacements; apparently, only relatively secure governments engage in such strategic manipulation. Figure 5 illustrates the estimated replacementrisk-augmented partisan-budget-cycles most clearly, plotting estimated deficit-paths for government partisanship oscillating regularly from CoG=3 to CoG=8 with 1-to-5-year frequency (approximately the sample-range). When such governments oscillate relatively infrequently (4 years or more), the right runs deficits and the left surpluses, opposite simple partisan theory. Conversely, when they alternate frequently (every 1-3 years), partisans behave as standard theory expects. Both venerable partisan-budget-cycle and newer debt-as-commitment theories appear to warrant revision. 
Figure 5: Deficits or Surpluses Created as Government Partisanship Oscillates at Different Frequencies
Debt-to-constrain-oppositions versions of strategic models seem to underestimate debtpersistence radically. Given the slow debt-adjustment, right incumbents who expect considerable partisan oscillation in government may be unwilling to increase debt to constrain the left because they expect to govern again soon enough, and it would then constrain them. Conversely, a secure right might think its hold on government safe enough to expend some security trying to alter the electorate's partisan preferences by increasing voter-held debt. If, instead, the left expected to govern long, it may be less willing than the right to tolerate structural deficits precisely because it has standard partisan interests for greater policy-responsiveness so that it must remain able to respond fiscally to any economic difficulties that may arise. A currently secure left may also try to bolster that security by maintaining or reducing voter-held debt-levels thereby alleviating any default-risk concerns about it among the electorate. An insecure left, contrarily, might respond more quickly and even to relatively small or imagined economic slumps both because it would lose office more surely if it does not and because it expects that the right will react insufficiently (by left standards) to any This replacement-risk-augmented partisan-budget-cycle theory accords with the findings here and with certain stylized facts about OECD postwar debt experiences. For example, Sweden's long-secure left kept debt relatively low while it was in power, whereas Italy's equally long-secure center-right produced unrestrained structural deficits. Meanwhile, the left (right) was more (less) associated with deficits (surpluses) in countries like the UK where left and right oscillated more frequently and with some regularity. While evidence for or against this reconsideration and broadening of partisan theory should not be drawn from the same sample used to derive the argument, these findings certainly recommend further theoretical development and empirical evaluation of the conjecture.
IV. Conclusions
Summarizing, the specific conclusions are two-fold. First, election-year politics are important both in that there is a statistically strong pre-and-post-electoral deficit cycle and in that debt adjusts so slowly that electoral-cycle frequency has sizable long-run impact on debt-to-GDP levels. Second, partisan budget-cycles are, typically, of rather less importance in explaining the OECD post-war debt-GDP experience (especially near sample means), and often run in directions opposite of conventional wisdom. A political system with frequent, large shifts of government partisanship, though, can have sizable partisan-budget-cycles that accord with common wisdom (Figures 3 and   5 ). Thus, both traditional and rational-expectations-strategic partisan theories of fiscal-policy manipulation need revision. The evidence suggests that policy makers may indeed be partisan and strategic, but previous theories seem to have under-estimated the slowness of debt-adjustment and so to have mis-assessed the actual interests of such strategic, partisan actors. High (low) incumbent replacement-risk appears to induce traditional (counter-intuitive) left-right policy-making behavior.
More generally, the results clearly call for theoretical and empirical reconsideration of both electoral and partisan budget-cycles. Much recent eulogizing notwithstanding, evidence for electoral budget-cycles is strong, given sufficient care to the temporal dynamics of the policy instrument being modeled and if pre-and post-electoral effects are considered. The study of partisan effects has also generally under-appreciated the empirical and theoretical importance of the policy-instrument's temporal dynamics. Even recent theories that stress strategic policy-maker manipulation of stock variables have apparently failed in this regard. Here, too, the evidence suggests fruitful avenues for theoretical and empirical reconsideration.
Methodological Appendix I
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of all variables that might reasonably contain unit roots were conducted. The null that debt contains a unit root cannot quite be rejected (.10 critical value -2.57, ADF statistic -2.14). Unemployment, trade openness, trade openness times terms of trade, the agedistribution, and its product with the income-disparity index all also potentially contain unit roots by ADF tests, but OLS residuals of debt regressed on various permutations of this set still potentially contained unit roots. Thus, employing a two-stage error-correction model directly would have been unwise. As Beck (1992) reviews, though, a one-stage error-correction-form model might nonetheless be appropriate in cases like this where several possible cointegrating or near-cointegrating factors are among the regressors to be considered. He suggests differencing the dependent variable and including its lag and appropriate lagged differences among the regressors, along with differences and levels of all potentially cointegrating variables. Only the economic controls were significant in both levels and changes. Other variables were significant only in levels or neither in levels or changes, the exceptions being income-distribution variables, which were significant only in changes, and agedistribution, which was significant in levels and changes. Thus, the reported results correspond to 1-stage error-correction where the economic controls and age-distribution enter in levels and changes, the income-and age-and-income-distribution variables enter in changes, and all other variables enter in levels only. In the model of Table 1 , the coefficient on lagged debt has a t-stat around -5.1, which would surely satisfy an ADF test, so inferences should be safe with respect to any lingering unit-root concerns.
Second, this specification also survives LaGrange Multiplier tests for autocorrelated residuals and Ljeung-Box tests up to six lags. Thus, the specification including two lagged differences of debt and one lagged debt-level satisfies all autocorrelation concerns.
Third, neither a straight linear trend nor one allowed to kink from pre-to post-1973 (trend variable, post-1973 indicator, and their interaction) were individually or jointly significant.
(Including them makes little substantive difference to the other coefficient estimates.) Therefore, they serve little purpose beyond increasing R2 and multicolinearity and reducing degrees of freedom. Moreover, the estimated trend was upward until 1973 and downward thereafter, opposite the trend observed in and so substantively odd. As a principle, linear trends are atheoretical variables for which theoretical replacements should be sought, therefore linear trends are gladly omitted from the reported model. (This choice does not affect any substantive conclusions.) Fourth, Wald tests of equal coefficients on the set of country dummies rejected in favor of the country fixed-effect model. There is one important difference in the model without fixed-effects from the reported results. The general shapes of the results on replacement-risk-augmented partisanbudget-cycles were unchanged but are more significant with the fixed-effects. This is not surprising since the CoG codes average indices intended to be country-specific. (Other differences were minor or of little substantive importance here; full details available from the author.) Fifth, analogous Wald tests supported time-period fixed-effects. However, rather than include 34 atheoretical dummies for years, a variable equal, for each country-year, to the average deficit that year in the other countries in the sample ( D~i ,t ) was devised. Using D~i ,t , time-dummies were more nearly rejected, and the key substantive results were unchanged, so the reported results include it instead. (Full details available from the author.) Sixth, the reported regression was estimated first by OLS. OLS residuals were then squared and regressed on a constant and the set of country-indicators less one. The F-statistic of that auxiliary regression tests panel heteroskedasticity against the null of homoskedasticity and was extremely high, implying panel-type heteroskedasticity at least at the .0001 level. Panel WLS was therefore applied and then the panel-corrected standard-errors suggested by Katz (1995, 1997 . "Consolidated central government" includes separate central administrations (e.g., social security). Where the CD-ROM gives no data but tape or print editions or OECD sources do, usable data are extended by country-specific fitting regressions employing all available other series. R 2 from fitting regressions usually exceeded 0.9. This procedure also maximizes available OECD gross and net generalgovernment (i.e., including sub-national) debt data. IMF data are employed because (a) they cover far larger sample prior to extension, (b) the political variables introduced below generally refer to central government, and (c) OECD generalgovernment data double-count in some countries. Nonetheless, correlations across series are comfortably high:
Correlation Franzese (1996b, ch. 3) more thoroughly explores empirically each of the several political-economic theories reviewed by . 4 Such observations are very rare, so capping ELE at 1 yields no appreciable difference in the results.
The US, Finland, and the French V th Republic are problematic here, having strong presidents. The simplifying assumption applied throughout is that Finnish and French presidents and cabinets are each ½ the government and that the US president, Senate, and House are 1/3 each. Thus, years prior to presidential elections only are ½ in Finland and France V as are years prior to parliamentary elections only. In the US, presidential and House elections each score 1/3 while the whole Senate scores 1/3, implying that each senate-election year scores (1/3)(1/3)=1/9. All US elections are assumed to occur the end of the first week of November. Schultz (1995) argues that manipulating the economy is costly in terms of lost reputation for sound policy and/or future detrimental economic repercussions so incumbents would likely employ pre-electoral manipulation only
